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DEFINING JOINT VISION 2010 IN TERMS OF SERVICE
CORE COMPETENCIES

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Lieutenant Commander Thomas C. Neal

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense.

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Abstract

Joint Vision 2010 provides the overall joint warfighting vision for the military services. The services provide the forces, systems and expertise to fulfill this vision. Each service has fundamental roles or core competencies it provides for the Nation's defense. How the services define their core competencies and align them with the new operational concepts of *Joint Vision 2010* is discussed. Since not all services use core competencies, suggested core competencies are derived from current service doctrine and vision documents. Despite the short time since *Joint Vision 2010* release, the services already are adapting and incorporating most *Joint Vision* operational concepts. As these concepts are developed, service core competencies will overlap in some areas. Inter-service rivalry concerning core competencies will continue and can be productive. Having a blend of service core competencies for use by the Joint Forces Commander is the key to future joint effectiveness to fulfill the *Joint Vision*.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Joint Vision is the conceptual template for how America's Armed Forces will channel the vitality and innovation of our people and leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting.

—Joint Vision 2010

Prior to the publishing of *Joint Vision 2010* each military service had separate visions of its strategic role in the nation's defense. The Navy and Marine Corps developed . . . *From the Sea* and then *Forward . . . From the Sea*, refocusing its efforts from the blue water operations to the littoral areas of the world. The Air Force developed *Global Reach—Global Power* describing its contributions to the nation's defense. The Army's *Force XXI* and *Army After Next* series of papers and concepts describe the Army's plan for the future focusing on its structure and capabilities. What was missing was a unified vision of joint warfighting.¹ *Joint Vision 2010* which fills this void "provides a common direction for our Services in developing their unique capabilities within a joint framework of doctrine and programs as they prepare to meet an uncertain and challenging future."²

Terms and Definitions

The Air Force describes its "unique capabilities" in terms of its "core competencies" which are "the fundamental contributions the Air Force provides for national security."³

A broader definition is that core competencies are “what a service does best.”⁴ Service core competencies are confusing when compared to the traditional terms of roles, missions and functions. Title 10 United States Code assigns the military services functions and responsibilities. In addition to the Title 10 duties, individual services have further defined and refined their specific missions, organizations and concepts of operation.⁵ Joint Publication 0-2 *Unified Action Armed Forces* states: “**roles** are the broad and enduring purposes for which the Services and the USSOCOM were established by Congress in law; **missions** are the tasks assigned by the National Command Authorities to the combatant commanders; while, **functions** are the specific responsibilities assigned by National Command Authority to enable the Services to fulfill their legally established roles.” The primary “function of the Services and United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is to provide forces organized, trained, and equipped to perform a role—to be employed by the combatant commander in the accomplishment of a mission.”⁶ For this research paper, core competencies are the fundamental roles that a service component commander conducts in support of the Unified Combatant Commander’s mission. Therefore, a discussion of core competencies is the same as the fundamental roles a service provides. For instance the Air Force’s core competency of air and space supremacy is the same as the role of gaining air and space supremacy. The Navy’s role of sea control is also one of its core competencies, its unique contribution to joint warfare.

Background

To meet future challenges *Joint Vision 2010* presents new operational concepts that must be developed to meet the changing global threats. To achieve “full spectrum dominance” the military must be able to dominate across the full range of military situations from humanitarian assistance through high intensity warfare.⁷ The new operational concepts of information superiority, dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimensional protection and focused logistics will enable full spectrum dominance.

These operational concepts are the cornerstone of *Joint Vision 2010*. Dominant maneuver is the “multidimensional application of information, engagement, and mobility capabilities to position and employ widely dispersed joint air, land, sea and space forces to accomplish the assigned operational tasks.”⁸ Precision engagement is “a system of systems that enables our forces to locate the objective or target, provide responsive command and control, generate the desired effect, assess our level of success, and retain the flexibility to re-engage with precision when required.”⁹ Full-dimensional protection is the “multi-layer capability to better protect our forces and centers of gravity at all levels from adversary attacks while maintaining freedom of action during deployment, maneuver and engagement.”¹⁰ Focused logistics is the “fusion of information, logistics, and transportation technologies to provide rapid crisis response, to track and shift assets even while en route, and to deliver tailored logistics packages and sustainment directly at the strategic, operational, and tactical level operations.”¹¹ Information superiority is the “capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information

while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same.”¹² The overreaching concept of information superiority enables all four new operational concepts.

The theme of this paper is to define service core competencies and describe how they align and support the new operational concepts of *Joint Vision 2010*. Each service brings its own perspectives, traditions, capabilities and ideas of its current and future role in the Nation's defense. These differing approaches provide insight to each service as they define their roles within the *Joint Vision*.

Notes

¹ John T. Correl, Joint Vision Editorial, Editor in Chief, *Air Force Magazine*, On-line. Internet, December 17, 1996. Available from <http://www.afa.org/magazine/08edit96.html>.

² Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Vision 2010*, Washington DC, July 1996, 1.

³ Air Force Strategy Division, HQ USAF/XOXS, *Air Force Executive Guidance*, October 1996 update, 2.

⁴ Lt. Col. Johnny Jones, USAF, *Core Competencies: Maintaining Service Identity for Joint Effectiveness*, On-line. Internet, November 8, 1996, *CADRE Air Chronicles*, available from <http://www.cdsar.af.mil/cc/influenc.html>.

⁵ Joint Publication 3-33, *Joint Force Capabilities, First Draft*, 30 June 1996.

⁶ Joint Publication 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAFF)*, 24 February. 1995, I-6, bolded text per original document.

⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1.

⁸ Ibid., 13.

⁹ Ibid., 14.

¹⁰ Ibid., 15.

¹¹ Ibid., 16.

¹² Ibid., 10.

Chapter 2

Service Core Competencies

Army Core Competencies

The Army “shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land.”

—Title 10 USC Sect 3062

The United States Army released *Army Vision 2010* in response to the operational concepts identified in *Joint Vision 2010*. The Army does not use or identify core competencies. Instead, it states the “fundamental competency” of the Army is the ability to “conduct prompt and sustained operations on land throughout the spectrum of crisis.”¹ This should be considered the Army’s primary core competency. Unfortunately, this is too broad to readily compare and discuss in the *Joint Vision 2010* framework.

To allow greater discussion, a more in-depth look is required. As stated in its previous vision document, *Force XXI*, the enduring role of the Army is to compel adversaries to accede to our will, to deter possible adversaries from taking action, to reassure our allies, and to support American interests abroad and at home.² The Army’s vision is to create a trained and ready strategic force capable of decisive victory into the 21st century. *Force XXI* objectives are dominate maneuver, project and sustain, conduct precision strikes, win the information war, and protect the force. *Army Vision 2010*

provides the next step in the evolution of the Army's strategic vision by adapting and updating *Force XXI* concepts to align with *Joint Vision 2010*.

Army Vision 2010 groups the normal tasks an army performs into a set of operational patterns. These patterns align with and enable the operational concepts of *Joint Vision 2010*. (see table 1)³

Table 1. Army Vision 2010 Operational Patterns

<i>Joint Vision Operational Concepts</i>	<i>Army Vision Operational Patterns</i>
Information Superiority	Gain Information Dominance
Dominate Maneuver	Project the Force Shape the Battlespace Decisive Operations
Precision Engagement	Shape the Battlespace Decisive Operations
Full Dimensional Protection	Protect the Force
Focused Logistics	Sustain the Force

Sources: Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Vision 2010*, Washington DC, July 1996: Department of the Army, *Army Vision 2010* (Washington DC: 11 November 1996, On-line. Internet available <http://160.147.68.21:80/2010/usajvc.htm>).

The first operational pattern is gaining information dominance which equates to *Joint Vision 2010*'s information superiority. Gaining information dominance enables and affects all other operational patterns. The *Joint Vision 2010* concept of dominate maneuver aligns with three of the Army operational patterns. At the strategic level, it projects the force which involves deploying army forces to the theater. However, at the operational level, the Army does not separate the *Joint Vision 2010* operational concepts of dominate maneuver and precision engagement. Both are included in the Army's operational patterns of shaping the battlespace and decisive operations. Shaping the battlespace is the "unambiguous integration of all combat multipliers—feints, demonstrations, limited attacks, command and control warfare, mobility/counter-

mobility, deception and all available fires.”⁴ Shaping the battlespace includes precision engagement. Decisive operations are those which “force the enemy to give in to our will.”⁵ Shaping the battlespace and decisive operations, along with a simultaneous scheme of maneuver, will overwhelm the enemy.⁶

The remaining Army operational patterns align precisely with *Joint Vision 2010* concepts. Full-dimensional protection aligns with protect the force which is “holistic in nature for the army using procedures, organization, material solutions to protect soldiers, and equipment across the spectrum.”⁷ Focused logistic aligns and equals the operational pattern of sustain the force. These operational patterns, along with new technologies, will enable the Army to achieve “full-spectrum dominance as the land component member of the joint team.”⁸

In addition to the operational patterns, *Army Vision 2010* redefines the missions of the Army. The redefined mission areas cover the entire range of conflict from peace operations and disaster relief to full scale war. The mission areas are defending or liberating territory, punitive intrusion, conflict containment, leverage, reassurance, core security, and humanitarian missions.⁹

By redefining its missions and aligning its operational patterns the Army has directly responded to *Joint Vision 2010*. However, it has not specifically stated its core competencies. Instead, the Army chooses to use broad concepts and missions to define its role in the nation’s defense. Thus, the discussion of its core competencies is problematic and requires extrapolating Army’s core competencies. Considering the preceding factors, one may deduce Army core competencies are the operational patterns of project the force, shape the battlespace, decisive operations and sustain the force all

enabled by gaining information dominance. These suggested core competencies will compel and deter adversaries, reassure allies and support our nation throughout the general mission areas. Finally, they support the Army's fundamental competency of conducting sustained and prompt land operations throughout the spectrum of conflict.

Naval Services Core Competencies

The Naval Services (Navy and Marine Corps) have not stated explicitly (or use the term) core competencies. Since the publishing of *Joint Vision 2010*, the Navy Department has not adapted its strategic focus nor has plans for a *Navy Vision 2010*.¹⁰ The vision documents . . . *From the Sea* followed by *Forward . . . From the Sea* provides the current maritime strategy for forward presence and littoral warfare. As Secretary of the Navy John Dalton states “. . . *From the Sea* and *Forward . . . From the Sea* will remain the backbone of the Navy Department's strategic planning.”¹¹ The Navy-Marine Corps team focus on the tenants published in . . . *From the Sea*. These tenants are to provide the nation with naval expeditionary forces, which are shaped for joint operations, and tailored for national needs.¹² He also states the Navy's planning is a “dynamic process” and the “Navy and Marine Corps have a clear mandate to regularly refresh our strategic plans and to update as necessary.”¹³ *Joint Vision 2010* states “power projection, enabled by overseas presence, will likely remain the fundamental strategic concept of our future force.”¹⁴ The Navy-Marine Corps team have solidly embraced this tenant with their “Expeditionary mind set, culture, and a commitment to operate forward and to respond swiftly.”¹⁵

Navy Core Competencies

The Navy shall be organized, trained and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea.

—Title 10 USC Sect 5062

Forward . . . From the Sea states “Most fundamentally, our naval forces are designed to fight and win wars.” Short of full scale war, recent naval operations have shown the most important role for naval forces is forward presence and early engagement to prevent conflicts and control crisis.¹⁶ Naval forces have five fundamental and enduring roles in support of the National Security Strategy.¹⁷ These roles are projection of power from sea to land, sea control and maritime supremacy, strategic deterrence, strategic sea lift, and forward naval presence. These fundamental and enduring roles equate to the Navy’s core competencies.

The primary and traditional role of the Navy is sea control and maritime supremacy. It is defending the United States by controlling its seaward approaches, gaining and maintaining control of the sea, and establishing forward sea lines of communication. Another traditional role of the Navy is projection of power from the sea to the land against tactical, operational and strategic targets. Additionally, the Navy provides strategic nuclear and conventional deterrence by forward deployed naval forces. Naval forces are available to respond to “diplomatic, political, and economic deterrent actions which can influence, persuade or pressure uncooperative governments around the world.”¹⁸ The Navy’s role of strategic sea lift is conducted by a mix of prepositioned, surge and sustainment lift. Forward naval presence completes the Navy’s final enduring role. Forward naval presence “promotes national influence and access to critical global areas, builds regional coalitions and collective security, furthers stability, deters

aggression, and provides initial crisis-response capability.”¹⁹ These five enduring roles are the Navy’s core competencies that form the backbone of the what the Navy provides for the nation’s defense.

Table 2. Navy Core Competencies

<i>Joint Vision Concepts</i>	<i>Naval Warfare Roles</i>	<i>Future Capabilities</i>
Information Superiority	Strategic Deterrence	Command, Control and Surveillance
Dominate Maneuver	Forward Naval Presence Sea Control and Maritime Supremacy Strategic Sea lift	Battlespace Dominance
Precision Engagement	Power Projection	Power Projection
Full-Dimensional Protection	Sea Control and Maritime Supremacy	Battlespace Dominance
Focused Logistics	Strategic Sea lift	Force Sustainment

Sources: Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Vision 2010*, Washington DC, July 1996: Naval Doctrine Publication 1, *Naval Warfare*, Washington DC, 28 March 1994.

The Navy’s vision documents and *Naval Warfare* project the future where naval forces are headed into the 21st century and encompass many of the *Joint Vision 2010* concepts (see table 2). The Navy retains its traditional roles of deterrence, sea superiority and protection of maritime trade but shifts its focus to the littoral operations.²⁰ With this shift, the Navy requires advancements in four critical operational capabilities for future naval expeditionary forces. The first advancement required is in command, control and surveillance which encompasses the gathering, processing, and distribution of information vital to the conduct of military planning and operations.²¹ This operational capability is similar to *Joint Vision*’s information superiority. Next, battlespace dominance is “the degree of control over the dimensions of the battlespace that enhances friendly freedom of action and denies the enemy of action.”²² This capability aligns with *Joint Vision*

concepts of dominate maneuver and full-dimensional protection. The power projection operational capability is the “application of offensive military force against an enemy at a chosen time and place.”²³ This capability aligns with the *Joint Vision* concept of precision engagement. Finally, the Navy’s force sustainment includes the capabilities, equipment and operations that ensure continuity, freedom of action, logistic support and command and control.²⁴ Force sustainment capability aligns with the *Joint Vision* concept of focused logistics. As shown, the Navy’s future operational capabilities align with *Joint Vision* concepts. These capabilities along with the proposed core competencies demonstrate the Navy’s alignment with the *Joint Vision*’s template for future joint warfighting.

Marine Corps Core Competencies

The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.

—Title 10 USC Sect 5063

As with the Navy, the USMC has not specifically stated its core competencies. The Marine Corps describes its roles, missions and operational tasks in Fleet Marine Force Manual 1-2 *Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense*. They closely follow the Marine Corps Title 10 responsibilities which serves as a focus for its force, doctrine and training development. The Marine Corps tasks and capabilities center around the traditional role of naval expeditionary warfare which includes amphibious warfare, land and air operations contributing to naval and continental campaigns and naval political reinforcement operations.²⁵ Secondary Marine Corps roles include naval aviation support of fleet operations, support of joint and combined operations, security support at United

States embassies, onboard Navy ships and naval stations and “such other duties as the President may direct.”²⁶ The Marine Corps fundamental role is naval expeditionary warfare. Its core competencies can be defined as amphibious warfare, land and air operations contributing to naval campaigns and supporting joint and combined continental campaigns.

The Marine Corps has not created a *Marine Corps Vision 2010* in response to *Joint Vision 2010*. As with the Navy, the current vision document for the Marine Corps is derived from . . . *From the Sea* and *Forward from the Sea*. Building from these tenants, *Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS)* charts the new Marine Corps operational concepts. *OMFTS* and *Joint Vision 2010* concepts and future operating environment are remarkable congruent. They both foresee a future where the United States will have the advantage in advanced technology, but with smaller forces spread over larger areas of the world. The emphasis will be to seek rapid success in military operations with weapons that destroy only the intended target where readiness for swift and effective response is required.²⁷

Table 3. Marine Corps Concepts

<i>Joint Vision Concepts</i>	<i>Operational Maneuver from the Sea Concepts</i>
Information Superiority	Command, Control and Intelligence
Dominate Maneuver	Mobility
Precision Engagement	Fires
Full-Dimensional Protection	Protection
Focused Logistics	Logistics

Sources: Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Vision 2010*, Washington DC, July 1996: Gen. C. C. Krulak, *Operational Maneuver from the Sea*, Washington DC, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1996, 5.

In *OMFTS*, the Marine Corps fundamental missions are unchanged but the emphasis has shifted to the littorals with regional conflicts in coastal waters and adjacent land areas.²⁸ In dealing with regional conflicts, Marine Corps missions include maintaining forward presence and friendly engagement, transitioning forces when crises arise and rapid engagement. This will end the conflict or provide lodgment for follow on Army and Air Forces with the Marine Corps continuing its participation in joint and combined operations.²⁹ To apply *OMFTS* it will require enhanced capabilities for the Marine Corps. These required capabilities follow closely to the new operational concepts of *Joint Vision 2010*. *OMFTS* command, control and intelligence aligns with information superiority, mobility with dominate maneuver, precision engagement with fires, full-dimensional protection with protection, and focused logistics with logistics.

Naval expeditionary warfare is the Marine Corps primary role. The proposed core competencies of amphibious warfare, land and air operations in support of naval campaigns, supporting joint and combined continental campaigns and naval political operations encompass what the Marine Corps does best. They are the fundamental roles the Marine Corps provide for the nation's defense. The vision presented in *OMFTS* and . . . *From the Sea* is forward thinking and includes the majority of the *Joint Vision* concepts. These together define the Marine Corps core competencies in terms of *Joint Vision 2010* concepts.

Air Force Core Competencies

In general, the Air Force includes aviation forces both combat and service not otherwise assigned. It shall be organized, trained and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations.

—Title 10 USC Sect 8062

The Air Force is the only service that has explicitly stated its core competencies. Additionally, the Air Force was the first service to respond to *Joint Vision 2010* with *Global Engagement*. *Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force* builds on previous tenants explained in *Global Reach—Global Power*. In *Global Engagement*, the Air Force realigned its tenants to the new operational concepts of *Joint Vision 2010* and “charts the Air Force’s path into the future.”³⁰

Table 4. Air Force Core Competencies

<i>Joint Vision 2010 Concept</i>	<i>Air Force Core Competencies</i>
Information Superiority	Information superiority
Dominate Maneuver	Rapid Global Mobility
Precision Engagement	Precision Engagement
Full Dimensional Protection	Air and Space Superiority
Focused Logistics	Agile Combat Support

Sources: Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Vision 2010*, Washington DC, July 1996: Air Force Strategy Division, HQ USAF/XOXS, *Air Force Executive Guidance*, October 1996 update.

The first Air Force core competency and one of the “fundamental contributions the Air Force provides for national security” are air and space superiority.³¹ It is the “degree of control necessary to allow United States and allied forces of all media to position, maneuver, employ, and engage freely, while denying the same ability to adversary forces.”³² Space superiority includes counter space, offensive counter space, defensive

counter space and national missile defense. Space superiority allows space operations free from enemy interference.

The second Air Force core competency is rapid global mobility. It is the timely moving of forces through air and space in all levels of military operations and includes airlift, air refueling and spacelift.³³ The third core competency is precision engagement. It is the ability to “precisely employ selective forces against an adversary to degrade his capability and will, or the use of forces to affect an event in such a way as to minimize risk and undesired collateral damage.”³⁴ Precision engagement includes strategic attack, interdiction, close air support, special air operations, combat search and rescue and precision air drop.

The last two Air Force core competencies are information superiority and agile combat support. Information superiority includes offensive counter information, defensive counter information, and information operations. Information superiority is “the capability to collect, process, disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.”³⁵ Finally, agile combat support allows forces to execute and maintain operations throughout the engagement and includes modernization, logistics, infrastructure, education and training.³⁶

As shown, the Air Force has quickly adapted its core competencies to the joint vision. In some cases, Air Force core competencies use the exact terms as the *Joint Vision 2010*. This provides a clear and simple statement of the Air Forces fundamental contributions for the nation’s defense and fully embraces the *Joint Vision* tenants.

Notes

¹ Department of the Army, *Army Vision 2010*, 12 November 1996, On-line. Internet, December 10, 1996. Available from <http://160.147.68.21:80/2010/usajv.htm>.

² Department of the Army, *America's Army of the 21st Century, Force XXI*, Washington DC, 15 January 1995, 3.

³ Department of the Army, *Army Vision 2010*, Available from <http://160.147.68.21:80/2010/usajvd.htm>.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Colin Clark and Tony Capaccio, "Army's New Vision Takes on 'Invalid' Air-power Theories," *Defense Week*, 17 no. 45 (12 November 1996), 11.

¹¹ John H. Dalton, Secretary of the Navy, "Steady As She Goes." Speech given to the Current Strategy Forum at Newport Rhode Island on 11 June 1996, On-line. Internet, December 12, 1996. Available from http://www.navy.mil/navpalib/people/secnav/speeches/car_stra.html

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3.

¹⁵ Dalton, Available from http://www.navy.mil/navpalib/people/secnav/speeches/car_stra.html

¹⁶ John H. Dalton, ADM Jeremy M. Boorda, and Gen. Carl E. Mundy Jr., *Forward . . . From the Sea*, (Washington DC: Department of the Navy, 1994), 4–5.

¹⁷ Ibid., 13.

¹⁸ Naval Doctrine Publication 1, *Naval Warfare*, Washington DC, 28 March 1994, 17–18.

¹⁹ Ibid., 20.

²⁰ Ibid., 60.

²¹ Ibid., 61–62.

²² Ibid., 63–64.

²³ Ibid., 64–67.

²⁴ Ibid., 68–70.

²⁵ Fleet Marine Force Manual 1-2, *The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense*, Washington DC, 21 June 1991, 3-6 to 3-18.

²⁶ Ibid., 3-18.

²⁷ Gen. C. C. Krulak, *Operational Maneuver from the Sea*, (Washington DC, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1996), 1–3.

²⁸ "Commentary on OMFTS." *Marine Corps Gazette*, July 1996, 13.

²⁹ Ibid., 14.

³⁰ Air Force Strategy Division, 2.

³¹ Ibid., 9.

Notes

³² Ibid., 9.

³³ Ibid., 14.

³⁴ Ibid., 17.

³⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10.

³⁶ Air Force Strategy Division, 28.

Chapter 3

Discussion

Focusing the strengths of each individual service on the operational concepts that achieve Full-Spectrum Dominance.

—Joint Vision 2010

Joint Vision 2010 forecasts dynamic and accelerated changes in the world—a world requiring smaller military forces with enhanced jointness, increased multinational operations engaging across the full spectrum of conflict from a variety of unknown potential adversaries.¹ Advanced technologies will increase the impact of long-range precision weapons, enlarge the number of potential weapons effects, mask platforms with low observable technology and improve information and systems integration all which significantly impact future military operations. Agile military organizations will be required to quickly adapt to this new and increasingly lethal battlespace by stealth, mobility, dispersion and increased operational tempo. How do the service core competencies fit into this changing world and how will the services adapt them to the *Joint Vision*?

Core Competencies and *Joint Vision 2010* Concepts

Do service core competencies include all the major principles of *Joint Vision 2010*? Currently, this is difficult to decide. First, not all services use or have defined their core

competencies. Second, due to the short period since *Joint Vision* was released, it has limited the services time to discuss or create doctrine and publish documents responding to *Joint Vision*. Currently, the implementation of *Joint Vision* is delayed due to the time required to receive and process the services inputs.² Despite this, the published and proposed core competencies and key service concepts presented in various current vision documents demonstrate the services already are adapting and incorporating most *Joint Vision* operational concepts.

Information superiority is the most critical *Joint Vision* operational concept. It is the foundation of all other concepts.³ Future joint operations will not be possible without common joint systems, procedures and training to enable collection, processing and dissemination of uninterrupted information to all forces and commanders.⁴ The Army's information dominance, the Navy's command, control and surveillance, the Marine Corps' command control and information and the Air Force's information superiority are similar and start to address this concept. Except for the Air Force, a noted weakness is that the services lack both offensive and defensive information warfare in their core competencies. A noted strength is all services propose developing seamless, joint command, control, communications and intelligence systems, which is vital for information superiority. Service efforts should expand and include development in all information superiority areas. All services recognize they will operate with each other and under joint command.⁵ Therefore, information superiority linking all forces is critical to conduct joint operations in the future.

The greatest divergence between the service core competencies exists with the concept of dominate maneuver. The Army splits the concept between the strategic level

project the force and the operational level decisive operations.⁶ For the Navy, dominate maneuver is part of deterrence, forward presence and sea lift. Marine Corps' mobility and the Air Force's rapid global mobility round out the service's input for dominate maneuver. Clearly, dominate maneuver holds different meanings and consequences for each service. To date the services have not addressed some of the key characteristics of dominate maneuver in their core competencies. These characteristics include "CONUS-to-combat" capability, rapid massing of effects from dispersed locations and seamless cross-service links.⁷ Additionally, dominate maneuver focuses on effects rather than geographical positioning.⁸ Most service core competencies concerning dominate maneuver still revolve around geography and their respective medium. The divergence of service core competencies and the immaturity of the dominate maneuver concept demonstrate the need for greater development within the services and the joint community.

Each of the services has representative core competencies addressing precision engagement. The concept is vastly improved to its predecessor, "strike."⁹ Both the Navy and Air Force, which have traditional core competencies in strike warfare, include the principles of precision engagement in power projection and precision engagement, respectively. The Army includes precision engagement as a part of the larger shaping of the battlespace while the Marine Corps includes it with its supporting air operations. As this concept matures, the symbiotic relationship between dominate maneuver and precision engagement must be explored and exploited.¹⁰ The key for all services is reliance on information superiority to provide the situation awareness and to conduct dominate maneuver and precision engagement.¹¹

The concept of full dimensional protection and service core competencies falls along more traditional service ideas and domains. The Navy's battlespace dominance includes its role of maritime supremacy and sea control. Air and space supremacy are the Air Force's core competency involving full-dimensional protection. The Army and Marine Corps core competencies stress protection of their land forces from attack. The increased availability of cheap, mass produced, precision guided munitions coupled with more sophisticated information systems creates a greater vulnerability to our forces.¹² This includes long-range cruise missiles, theater ballistic missiles, smart mines and various air defense weapon systems. To achieve full-dimensional protection the services must apply active measures to guarantee air, space, sea and information superiority.¹³ Passive measures will also be required including dispersion, deception and improved detection capabilities to reduce risk of attack.¹⁴ The main issue will be the integration of assets to create a seamless, multi-layer defense for all forces.

The focused logistics concept impacts all the services. The ultimate goal is to ensure the "right logistic support gets to the right place at the right time."¹⁵ The services core competencies addressing this include the Army's sustain the force and the Air Force's agile combat support. The Navy and Marine Corps continue to focus on sea based logistic support. Focused logistics will enable future joint forces to be more mobile, dispersed, versatile and have a smaller footprint.¹⁶ In a world of decreasing assets, increasing power projection requirements and vulnerable logistic lines of communication, developing focused logistic capabilities will be critical to all military operations.¹⁷

The new operational concepts require development by all services to achieve full spectrum dominance. Future military forces will require dominance over the entire

spectrum of conflict from peacetime activities to war.¹⁸ The primary task of the military remains to deter conflict “. . . but, should deterrence fail, to fight and win our Nation’s wars.”¹⁹ *Joint Vision* states, “to ensure we can accomplish these tasks, power projection, enabled by overseas presence, will likely remain the fundamental strategic concept of our future force.”²⁰

The services have different core competencies and operational concepts supporting deterrence and power projection. The Army stresses its role in “preventative defense” through peacetime engagement of Army forces with nation building and foreign military contacts.²¹ The Army deters aggression by the threat of employing and deploying its fully trained, motivated forces equipped with modern warfighting systems against possible adversaries.²² The Navy–Marine Corps team have a long history of forward presence and power projection. The Navy’s core competencies of deterrence and forward presence continue their roles. The Marine Corps, which advertises itself as “America’s 911 force,” has had a constant role throughout its history based on the “power projection of force in peace or war” and the “readiness for expeditionary service.”²³ Today, the Marine Corps’ *OMFTS* concept is refining its power projection capabilities for the future.²⁴ Together, the Navy–Marine Corps teams is “the leading edge of the world’s most capable military, and their well-understood ability to project power is the key factor in deterrence.”²⁵ For the Air Force, its core competencies of rapid global mobility, global attack and precision engagement are the cornerstone for its deterrence and power projection capabilities. As Major General Link, USAF states, “modern airpower attuned to *JV 2010* will be better suited than in its past to directly pursue political-military objectives.”²⁶ Air power can contribute to deterrence or if required eliminate or reduce an enemy’s ability to resist our

political objectives.²⁷ Combined together the services and their core competencies demonstrate the importance placed on deterrence and power projection and fully support the concepts presented in *Joint Vision 2010*.

Should Core Competencies Overlap

A key question for discussion is, should service core competencies overlap? Redundant and duplicative systems and efforts are wasteful and unaffordable especially with smaller Defense Department budgets. Despite this, some core competencies should overlap if services require them to conduct their assigned responsibilities. Each service focuses their efforts in their operating medium—the Army on land operations, the Air Force on air and space operations, and the Navy and Marine Corps on maritime and littoral operations.²⁸ To conduct all these operations each service must use the other's medium at times. All the services fly and deliver weapons through the air, are supported from space, and supplied via sea and air lift. In some cases, individual services should dominate a core competency by default. The Navy's core competency of strategic sea lift and sea control, the Marine Corps amphibious warfare and the Air Force's rapid global mobility are few examples of single service core competencies.

Core competencies should overlap if a warfare area is vital to modern conflict and all services. For example, all services currently have systems and core competencies in precision engagement. The Army includes precision engagement in their larger concept of shaping the battlespace, the Navy calls it power projection, the Marine Corps relies on air operations to support the Marine Air Ground Task Force and finally the Air Force has precision engagement. In addition, all the services need core competencies in information

superiority, focused logistics and full-dimensional protection. Core competencies differ between the services in their level of effort and effect in each operating medium. For example, both the Air Force's air superiority and the Navy's maritime supremacy core competencies require air superiority. The difference is the scale of effort and effect in the operating medium. The Air Force's air superiority is theaterwide and focused solely on air operations. Navy maritime supremacy concerns the littoral and maritime operating areas and focuses on surface, undersea and air operations. The drafters of *Joint Vision 2010* did not intend for one service to have sole ownership of certain operational concepts.²⁹ Instead, each service should develop core competencies in each *Joint Vision* operational concept. Redundant systems and duplicative individual missions should be minimized, not core competencies. The key is to seamlessly integrate the unique capabilities each service brings to the Joint Force Commander in joint operations.

Interservice Rivalry and Core Competencies

Interservice rivalry and the roles and missions debate have been a divisive force in the Department of Defense. Since core competencies are the fundamental roles the services conduct, interservice rivalry and competition can be expected over core competencies. Already, there is debate between the Army's emphasis on dominate maneuver versus the Air Force's and Navy's advance of precision engagement.³⁰ More debates are sure to follow. Interservice rivalry was one cause leading to the Goldwaters-Nichols Act since services themselves could not resolve their problems. After ten years, the reforms have created changes. The power of the Secretary of Defense and

Commander Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) has increased, Commander in Chief's (CINC) fight the war, with the services providing the forces—jointness is here.³¹

This rivalry and competition are not necessarily negative and can be productive. Rivalry is positive if it focuses on ideas on how to do things better.³² The hard decisions between competing services should be debated and argued within the services and then the choices made at the CJCS level. This debate should center on integration and reduction of redundant service systems missions. Now that Goldwater-Nichols is well on track, the debate can be healthy if it is over what the services provide for use by the CINC's.³³ Maintaining service core competencies, which then are available for use by the Joint Force Commanders to meet the specific missions assigned, best achieves the nation's interest.³⁴ Therefore, effective jointness is a blend of service core competencies used by the CINC to meet objectives.³⁵

Notes

¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, 5–10.

² “Joint Vision Plan Taking Its Time,” *Navy Times*, 24 March 1997, 30.

³ Joint Warfighting Center, *Concept of Future Joint Operations, Initial Draft: Expanding Joint Vision 2010's Ideas*, Fort Monroe, Va., 23 September 1996, 46.

⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10–12.

⁵ “Commentary on OMFTS,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, 13.

⁶ Department of the Army, *Army Vision 2010*, Available from <http://160.147.68.21:80/2010/usajve.htm>.

⁷ Joint Warfighting Center, 51.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 74.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 51.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 76.

¹² *Ibid.*, 77.

¹³ Joints Chief of Staff, 16.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Joint Warfighting Center, 54.

¹⁶ Joints Chief of Staff, 17.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

Notes

- ¹⁸ Joints Chief of Staff, 2.
- ¹⁹ Ibid.
- ²⁰ Ibid., 3.
- ²¹ Department of the Army, *Army Vision 2010*, Available from <http://160.147.68.21:80/2010/usajva.htm>.
- ²² Ibid.
- ²³ FMFM 1-2, 1-1.
- ²⁴ “Operational Maneuver From the Sea: Challenge and Opportunity,” *Amphibious Warfare Review*, Winter/Spring 1996, 10.
- ²⁵ NDP-1, 17.
- ²⁶ Maj. Gen. Charles D. Link, “21st Century Armed Forces—Joint Vision 2010,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Autumn 1996, 72.
- ²⁷ Ibid.
- ²⁸ Jones, available from <http://www.cdsar.af.mil/cc/core.html>.
- ²⁹ Lt. Col. Edward J. Felker, Joint Warfighting Center, Notes from meeting at Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 20 November 1996.
- ³⁰ Tony Capaccio, “Army Readies for Defense Review Food Fight with Air Advocates,” *Defense Week*, Volume 17 no. 46 (18 November 1996), 15.
- ³¹ Micheal B. Donely, “Prospects for the Military Departments,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Autumn 1996. 58–60.
- ³² Dr. William E. Turcotte, “Service Rivalry Overshadowed,” *Airpower Journal*, X no. 3 (Fall 1996): 28, 29.
- ³³ Dr. Don M. Snider, “The US Military in Transition to Jointness: Surmounting Old Notions of Interservice Rivalry,” *Airpower Journal*, X no. 3 (Fall 1996): 17–19.
- ³⁴ Jones, available from <http://www.cdsar.af.mil/cc/core.html>.
- ³⁵ Ibid.

Chapter 4

Conclusions

The challenge will consist of further developing competencies for new, limited missions while enhancing joint warfighting—a daunting task given the likelihood of continuing resource constraints.

—H. Graves and D. Snider
JFQ Autumn 1996

Core competencies are the fundamental roles each service provides for the Nation's defense. Currently, not all services use the term and or have stated their core competencies. Each service should define its core competencies. This would provide a clear, concise and simple description of what each service provides for use by the Joint Force Commander and CINC's. Additionally, core competencies provide soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen the underlying roles of their own and sister services. One of the values of joint warfare is teamwork.¹ Knowledge of your own and sister services core competencies can lead to more trust and confidence among the services leading to greater teamwork.

As the services respond to the strategic direction of *Joint Vision 2010*, they must adapt and change to the new environment. The United States military strengths will still lie in the forces the services provide with their core competencies that reflect their different capabilities, cultures and traditions.² Each service should develop their core competencies that will “prevail in their respective areas” but also to support, train and

operate jointly.³ To fulfill the template provided by *Joint Vision 2010* each service faces a different set of problems.

The suggested Army core competencies support its stated “fight and win America’s wars.” The Army’s response to *Joint Vision 2010* is *Army Vision 2010* in which they developed new operation patterns that support the seven updated missions for the Army. These operational patterns should form the basis for Army core competencies. The Army faces two major challenges with its vision. First, the future of precise, long-range and lethal fire systems places the Army’s (and Air Force’s) use of forward bases in jeopardy.⁴ Forward bases, entry at airfields and seaports will become vulnerable targets.⁵ Second, the Army needs to enhance its power projection capabilities from CONUS bases. To accomplish this, Army light forces need greater power and the heavy forces need smaller footprints (heavy the light and lighten the heavy forces) to be effective power projection forces.⁶ The Army will need to build its core competencies and forces to solve these problems and continue to develop the *Joint Vision 2010* concepts.

The Navy and Marine Corps should state their core competencies. The proposed core competencies are derived from the current vision documents of *Forward . . . From the Sea*, *Operational Maneuver from the Sea* and NDP-1. These core competencies represent the historic, current and future roles of the naval services, which are as Secretary of the Navy John Dalton states, “to provide the Nation with Naval Expeditionary Forces which are Shaped for Joint Operations . . . and tailored for National Needs.”⁷ Many of these core competencies align already with tenants of *Joint Vision 2010*. The Navy and Marine Corps are especially designed for deterrence and power projection, a cornerstone of *Joint Vision 2010* future forces. With no current peer

competitor, the Navy's dilemma will be to prepare itself for the greatest threat of a rival navy while still being able to respond to its current responsibilities. For the Marines to reach the new *OMFTS* concepts they must lighten their forces, develop all indirect fire support from the fleet and rely on major logistic support afloat vice ashore.⁸ As the concepts of *Joint Vision 2010* are developed, the Navy and Marine Corps should respond with its "mandate" to update its strategic thinking and planning, including its core competencies.⁹

Of the services, only the Air Forces directly states its core competencies and aligns them with the *Joint Vision 2010* concepts. It sees air power and the Air Force as "pivotal in modern warfare missions because it protects all forces and enables all operations."¹⁰ Despite this optimistic view, the Air Force has its challenges. The Air Force faces a similar forward basing vulnerability as discussed previously with the Army. Within the Air Force, proponents of strategic bombing view an increased emphasis on airlift, air and space superiority and direct support to land forces as detracting from the "birthright" of strategic bombing.¹¹ The Air Force will need to continue to refine and update them as the *Joint Vision 2010* concepts develop.

Overall, *Joint Vision 2010* provides the unifying vision for the services. The services have made significant progress in developing the new operational concepts. All services should have core competencies involving all concepts and with some overlapping when required to conduct their essential tasks. Interservice rivalry will continue including debate over core competencies. The improvement made in the past ten years with Goldwater-Nichols reforms, the debate should be healthy and constructive leading to the best military force structure for the whole country not just the preeminence of one service.

Now the services must adapt, modify and perhaps tradeoff their core competencies to provide the best military for the nation. Each service has innovation centers, war fighting labs and strategic study groups to peer into the future and experiment with new forces, ideas and organizations. These include the Army's *Force XXI* and *Army After Next*, the Navy's *Strategic Studies Group* and *Navy After Next*, the Marine Corps' *Sea Dragon* and the Air Forces *Coronas*. These efforts must continue with *Joint Vision 2010* providing the unifying vision in the development of the new operations concepts. The key will be to innovate and integrate service core competencies jointly.

Notes

¹ Joint Publication 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, Washington DC, 10 January 1995, II-6.

² Link, 70.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Andrew F. Krepinevich, "Competing for the Future: Searching for Major Ellis," *Marine Corps Gazette*, November 1996, 32–33.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Department of the Army, *Army Vision 2010*, Available from <http://160.147.68.21:80/2010/usajvb.htm>.

⁷ Dalton, Available from http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/people/secnav/speeches/car_stra.html.

⁸ Krulak, 1–3.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Link, 72.

¹¹ Robert P. Haffa, "Wake-Up Call: What the Air Force Study On Long-Range Planning Should Conclude," *Armed Forces Journal International*, September 1996, 54–55.

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